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I. Introduction
This paper studies the role of job structure when a firm decides to downsize its workforce.
Despite the long tradition of research on the economies of organizational hierarchies, surprisingly
little is known about the role of hierarchies in firms’  decisions to restructure their workplace.
Hierarchies are often understood as efficient outcomes of personnel assignment policies,
1 and their
role in the determination of the distribution of earnings within the firm is fundamental.
2
Adaptations in the organizational structure of the firm may be prompted by technological
innovations, especially when adjustments to shocks require changes in specialization. Workplace
reforms can then be characterized by adjustments of the hierarchical structure of jobs.
3
Our contribution is twofold: First, we analyze the reorganization process. The decision
process of changing the structure of jobs and of laying off individual workers is taken jointly. For
this, we use personnel data from a large industrial firm. The restructuring of the firm’ s workplace
is done as part of a bankruptcy spin-off and involves substantial downsizing. Within the firm the
organization of work is divided between skill groups with separate hierarchical job structures and
personnel dynamics. There are no immediate adjustments in individual wages. During the
reorganization, there is no substitution of skills and the structure of jobs remained the same such
th at th ere i s n o decrease i n  th e h ei gh t of  th e hi erarchi cal  py rami d. Th e n um ber of  workers  a t
successive levels was, however, affected in such a way that control spans changed.
A second contribution of this paper is that we relax the strict assumption of rescaling in the
hierarchical pyramid structures. While recent theoretical models of hierarchical organizations have
assumed that the downsizing involves a rescaling of the pyramidal structure leaving the relative
1 Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Calvo and Wellisz (1979); MacLeod and Malcomson (1988).
2 Marshak and Radner (1972); Medoff and Abraham (1980); Rosen (1982); Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994).
3 Radner (1992), Rajan and Wulf (2006).2
span of control among different levels unchanged,
4 w e  r e l a x  t h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i n  o u r  m o d e l
estimation. We find evidence against the assumption of monotonicity of the downsizing decision,
i.e. the downsizing affects the levels of the firm differently. Fixed costs, such as firing cost, imply
a composite response to shocks. This is based on the prediction from modern dynamic factor input
models under uncertainty that a firm’ s management will be in favour of large and infrequent
changes in the workplace.
5 This lumpiness of downward employment adjustments is often argued
to be caused by large transaction costs that such operations involve. A firm will not adjust the
productive workforce after each single shock in, for example, technology, demand or labour
market policy. Irreversible costs of adjustment are the driving force behind waiting until a
sufficiently large number of different shocks render restructuring profitable or inevitable. If at
some point the corporate management decides to restructure the workforce, what will then be
observed in the data is the simultaneous and composite response to the collection of past shocks.
We investigate the composite effects of two different shocks: policy shocks that relate to
employment protection legislation and shocks to productivity. Our results show that jobs in the top
levels of each skill group’ s hierarchy benefit more from productivity enhancing shocks and are
better protected against downsizing risk through firing costs. In reorganizations, both effects
increase the distance of average earnings of the two skill groups. While the productivity effect may
be the most well-known, the effect of employment protection on the increasing wage discrepancy
is less well-known but significant as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The data are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents
th e hi erarchi cal  deci si on m odel . Secti on  4 presen ts  th e esti m ati on  resul ts  an d th e ou tc om es  of
model specifications tests. In Section 5, the results of a simulation analysis of shocks in firing costs
are shown. Section 6 concludes.
4 See e.g. Rosen (1982), Ferrall (1997), Garicano (2000).
5 See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for an early survey of this literature. Pfann (2006) presents a simple structural
labour demand model with heterogeneity of firing costs and productivity across workers but without job structure.3
II. A firm in demise
  The empirical labour market literature repeatedly makes the distinction between high
skilled and low skilled workers or blue collar and white collar jobs to illustrate differences in
adjustment costs. In most large firms, however, the inputs of different productive skills are often
characterized by distinct job structures with separate internal labour market dynamics. The simple
distinction between high and low skills conceals the role of hierarchies in the decision process to
change the organization of the workplace.
Fokker, a technologically advanced aircraft building company with headquarters in
Amsterdam, was declared bankrupt on Friday March 15, 1996. The data we use for this study
incorporates the records of all tenured workers employed on the day of the bankruptcy in all three
restructured plants. The reorganization took place over the weekend of March 16 and 17, 1996. On
Monday March 18, the trustees rehired 20 percent of the former workers in those three plants. The
o t h e r  w o r k e r s  w e r e  p e r m a n e n t l y  l a i d  o f f .  I n  t h e  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f
dismissals was dictated by the aim to maximize the value of the reorganized firm. The personnel
trustees were responsible for the subsequent selection process of workers
6.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
Table 1 presents the input of manual and non-manual workers before and after the
reorganization. Precise determination of skill groups is often quite difficult. In our data the firm's
internal labour market is characterized by two different ports of entry: one for manual workers and
6 See Deterink et al. (1997) for the precursors' report and for an in depth description of the firm's reorganization.4
one for non-manual workers. We refer to the two types of workers as skill groups, as they had their
own hierarchical structure and their own career patterns.
7  Table 1 shows the input ratio of two
manual to one non-manual worker. The ratio of manual to non-manual worker remained unaltered
after the downsizing.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Table 2 shows means and SD of hourly wages for all workers as well as separate statistics
for women and men, for low and high education, below or above medium tenure, and below and
above average age. On average, we find an increase of 1.9 percentage points in the overall hourly
compensation between skill groups. The increase, however, is much larger for low educated young
workers with below-median tenure, and especially for women.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Table 3 shows that before as well as after the organizational change manual workers are educated
less than non-manual workers and that the average educational level is higher for more
authoritative levels in both skill groups
8. Manual workers operate in three hierarchical levels (team
workers, team leaders, and heads of production teams); non-manual workers operate in five levels.
However, due to small sample sizes we merged the upper two levels yielding in total four levels
(assistant engineers, engineers, senior engineers, managers).
[INSERT TABLE 4]
7 See Dohmen et al. (2004) for a comprehensive description of the data.
8 A theoretical explanation for the finding that more complicated tasks -- of non-manual workers -- coincide with an
increase in the height of the hierarchical pyramid is discussed in Garicano (2000).5
Table 4 shows the changes in the hierarchical job structure for each skill group. We find
indeed that even though the number of workers at different hierarchical sublevels changed, the
pyramidal form of the workforce remained unaffected and no sublevels disappeared (no
flattening). However, control spans did not increase or decrease monotonically. Restructuring
firms face large and mostly sunk transaction costs. Such costs will induce the firm's management
to postpone substantial restructurings
9. Once the reorganization is imminent, however, one
observes the compounded response to a collection of various shocks. This response may not only
affect the relative demand for individual workers, but may also lead to differences in the
adjustment of control spans as well. The bankruptcy provided the one time opportunity to adjust
the workforce without the adjustment cost. However, future adjustment costs are taken into
account.
III. Specification of the Hierarchical Decision Model
Fig. 1 presents the tree structure of the hierarchical decision model. Three interrelated
levels of decisions can be distinguished: (i) the allocation of workers to jobs in manual and non-
manual skill levels; (ii) the hierarchical organization within these two levels; and (iii) the lay-off
decision of heterogeneous workers in a given hierarchical level of a given skill group. This
sequence of decisions can be described by a hierarchical decision model (Tversky, 1972)
expressed in the latent random profitability form so that the resulting choices are consistent with an
optimal decision process under uncertainty (McFadden, 1984; Small, 1987). However, the
hierarchical decision model presented in this paper is an extension of these models with the Lazear
and Rosen (1981) feature of corporate hierarchies being built into it.
[INSERT Fig. 1]
9 See Pindyck (1991) for a lucid explanation of the role of sunk fixed costs on the decision to wait to invest.6
Suppose that the latent profitability Ȇihsof worker i in level h of skill group s is random and
can be written as
Ȇihs= ZhsĮ + Xiȕțhs + İihs Ł Vihs+ İihs with s = 1,…,S ;  h|s = 1,..,Hs; i|hs = 1,…,Nhs        (1)
where S is the number of skill groups, Hs denotes the height of the hierarchical pyramid of skill
group s, with h = 1 being the top level; and Nhs the number of workers in level h of skill group s.
Zhs is a matrix of level specific characteristics, Xi is a vector of worker specific attributes, Į and ȕ
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10 The
probability of choosing worker i from level h of skill group s to stay has a nested probability form
and can be written as the conditional probability of selecting that worker from a specific level hs:
Pr(Ȇihs> 0 | h,s) =  exp(Xiȕ | h,s) / (1 + exp(Xiȕ | h,s))           (2)
times the probability worker i is in level h. We follow Lazear and Rosen (1981) and assume that if
worker i is assigned to job-level h and worker j  is assigned to the lower job-level h+1, it holds that
E[Ȇihs | s] > E[Ȇjh+1s | s]. The positive relation between hierarchical position and higher individual
productivity is, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) the result of an allocation through merit-based
promotions.
Then the probability given in equation 2 is ordered and yields the nested ordered
probability
11
10 See Boskin (1974) for an early application of conditional logit to optimal occupational choice under uncertainty.
11 See Marshak (1959) for the formal derivation of a single level ordered model in MNL form that is subject to the
restrictive Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) feature. See Small (1987) for formal derivations of the
two-level nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model. Our model reduces to the simple MNL model with the IIA feature
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i hs X J ) exp( 1 log b  defines the inclusive value of workers in level h of skill type s.
hs hs J k  can be interpreted to reflect the minimum productivity level for a given worker to be kept
within the level.
Production technology is changed through variation in factor input ratios. Here it is
sufficient to assume that the input ratios of different skill groups are fixed. This assumption is
motivated by the statistics presented in the previous section, which suggests that the workforce
reorganization was not inspired by a substantial change in production technology, but has been a
production costs reducing operation. The result is a two-level nested ordered hierarchical decision
model with ( ) hs k b a q , , ”  being the model’ s parameters. The model determines the size of the
hierarchical level, and by ordering the workers productivity based on X given Z, it also determines
the selection of workers into hierarchies.
We suggest a two-step estimation procedure to obtain estimates for ș as in Maddala (1983,
p67-88) and Wooldridge (2002). First, estimate ȕ by applying conditional logit with the
hierarchical levels as the group indicator. Second, compute hs J ˆ and estimate Į and țhs by maximum
likelihood. We slightly modify the second step of the common estimation procedure to allow for
the ordered nature of the hierarchical levels and estimate (3) in ordered form with hs hs hs J k g ”
being the profit thresholds separating the hierarchical levels, and
s H s s g g g > > > ... 2 1 . The model
requires a normalization restriction, which is 0 =
s H g , so that 0 ... 1 1 > > > - s H s g g . It reduces to the
standard multinomial logit model with the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) feature
under testable parameter restrictions. A hierarchical model specification test yields țhs  1 and a8
test of the IIA feature yields țh s  = 1 for all { } 1,..., 1 s hH ˛- . These tests are performed in the
empirical analysis.
IV. An Econometric Investigation of the Model
The hierarchical decision model incorporates two sets of explanatory variables. One set of
variables, included in the matrix Z, contains level specific characteristics. The other set, included
in the matrix X, exists of worker specific attributes.
Level specific characteristics: technological innovation
The literature on corporate hierarchies discusses only a handful of possible causes for the
observed changes in the delegation of authorities. Since the sophistication of information
technologies at the workplace renders the provision of information and the decision making of
middle managers obsolete, technology shocks are associated with a decrease in the relative size of
the middle management in large organizations (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 1997). This is
consistent with the results presented in Table 4 where we observed decreases in the span of control
of team leaders (M2) and of engineers (NM2).  Increases in the use of information technology can
increase the span of control of managers (cf. Garicano, 2000). In Table 4 this assertion is supported
for heads of production teams (M3), and for senior engineers (NM3), but not of managers (NM4).
Rajan and Wulf (2006) argue that changes in information technologies may eventually lead to a
complete elimination of some of the hierarchical levels. Although not observed in the data used for
this paper, the model presented here does allow for the probability of ‘ flattening’  of hierarchical
structures.9
Whether profits are increasing or decreasing the wage change is positively related to the
profit change (Pfann, 2006). As a consequence, ) (t hs W D  is a good proxy for the impact of changing
productivity on profits. ) (t hs W D  is computed as the level-specific hourly wage growth over a period
of three years preceding the bankruptcy, averaged over all workers that were employed at the day
of the bankruptcy. During this period, the firm did not hire new workers. The growth rate of hourly
wages for manual workers is 0.8 percent and 1.2 percent for non-manual workers. The wage
growth difference between the two skill groups thus yields 0.4 percentage points.
Level specific characteristics: transaction costs
The literature on intermittent adjustment of the workforce at the firm level focuses
primarily on the importance of fixed transactions costs. Transaction costs of workforce reductions
are associated with severance pay.Severance pay or, more generally, firing costs are influenced by
job security policies.
12 Termination of employment legislation determines severance payments in
association with the legal term of notice (ToN). In the Netherlands, employment protection rules
are legally defined in Articles 1639i and 1639j of the Netherlands Civil Code and Article 40.3 of
the Bankruptcy Act. The ToN is equal to the time that passes between two consecutive earnings
instalments not extending a period of six weeks. The minimum ToN for tenured workers is the
number of weeks equal to the number of years employees have worked full time for the same
employer since adulthood, but not extending a period of 13 weeks. The ToN is extended with one
week for every full year of employment of workers of age 45 years or older, but not extending a
period of 13 weeks. The legal maximum ToN is therefore equal to 26 weeks.
12 See Table 8.2 in Hamermesh (1993) for a list of international studies on the effects of job-security policies. Oyer and
Schaefer (2002) show that changes in employment protection policies can change the distribution of wages and
employment across members of protected groups of workers. Pfann (2006) shows that lay-off decisions depend
strongly on the distribution of heterogeneous firing costs.10
Fig. 2 shows the ToN and firing costs for all hierarchical levels of both skill groups on
March 15, 1996. For manual workers the average is 12.0 weeks (SD=4.4); for non-manual workers
the average is 11.9 weeks (SD=5.1) weeks. Note that ToN increases by with the hierarchical level.
For manual workers the average firing costs are 11940 Dutch guilders (SD=5400); for non-manual
workers the average is 20770 Dutch guilders (SD=12610). Moreover, firing costs also increase
with each hierarchical levels and rise steeper than ToN.
[INSERT Fig. 2]
Worker specific attributes
The downsizing process followed a set of rules formulated around three different types of
worker attributes: performance indicators related to performance on the job, behavioural
characteristics related to conduct in the work context, and social criteria related to fairness quota
that were agreed upon prior to restructuring in negotiations with the worker councils.
13 External
observers were assigned to each selection team to guarantee compliance with these rules, to
warrant objectivity in the decisional process, and to prevent maintaining ‘ old-boys-networks’ .
Primary goal was, however, to create a workforce that allowed for a maximization of expected
future profits. This to create revenue when the ‘ leaner’  bankruptcy spin-off of the company were to
be sold by the bankruptcy trustees.
We observe all administrative data that is underlying the decision process. However, we are
in our estimation ignorant of any information that was only informally known to the selection
team. We use the following information: Performance indicators listed as criteria for the selection
13 The Fokker bankruptcy involved the largest displacement of workers in the history of the Netherlands. Because of
this unique situation, the trustees consulted teams of department heads and representatives of the workers council and
the appropriate unions to formulate selection rules.11
teams included annual job performance
14 scores, ranging between 1 (bad) and 6 (excellent); tenure
being measured in years; and education being measured in nine education levels, as well as a
dummy variable for the education being primarily vocational. The educational composition of the
firm’ s workforce reflects the traditional industrial character of the firm’ s production technology:
69% of all workers had vocational schooling. Language skills were also listed as performance
indicators, but the personnel data did not contain information on this aspect so that we cannot
include it in the estimation.
Behavioural characteristics listed as criteria for the selection teams were communication
skills, mental flexibility, creativity, interest in other people, need for structure, emotional stability,
self-confidence, frustration tolerance, being a team-worker, leadership, and learning capacity. Most
of these items are not available in the personnel data files. Taken together, they reflect a superior's
perception of the worker’ s ability to implement tasks, to take responsibility, and citizenship. This
perception is partially revealed by the assignment of workers to on-the-job training courses. The
firm offered two types of training courses to enhance firm-specific knowledge of the production
process and to improve general skills; 90% of all manual workers followed one or more internal
courses and 44% followed one or more external courses; for non-manual workers these numbers
are 84% and 64%, respectively. Finally, the variable commuting distance (in kilometres) is related
to the - unpaid - time a worker invests daily to go to work and may also be interpreted as a
behavioural characteristic.
Social criteria or fairness quota included (partial or temporary) disability, cultural minority
groups, single mothers, families with husband and wife both working at the same firm and the age
distribution in general. Information on marriage to a coworker, the number of children, or race is
not available in the personnel data, but it does contain information on age, gender (1=female;
14 Names of variables are put in italics as they appear in the Tables.12
0=male), marital status (not married=0, including divorce; married=1), as well as information on
temporary partial disability (in %).
[INSERT TABLE 5]
The upper part of Table 5 reports the parameter estimatesb ˆ  that belong to the worker
specific attributes and measures the conditional probability to select a worker to stay with the
company. Workers with higher performance evaluation scores were facing lower lay-off risks, but
higher educated workers were separated more. This last effect was also observed in Table 3 where
the average education of non-manual workers decreased relatively a bit more than of manual
workers. As for the behavioural characteristics, two factors are found to be significant. The number
of internal training courses increased the lay-off probability. This indicates that internal courses
were meant to train those workers whose initial talents were developed less than that of their peers,
but those lags have not been quite made up. Commuting distance coincides with lower lay-off risks
indeed. This result supports the idea that the willingness to travel further for the same job is
considered to be a positive behavioural aspect. Even though social criteria played an important role
in the whole reorganization process the firm still preferred to retain younger workers, while being
married turned out to reduce the lay-off risk significantly.
The lower part of Table 5 presents the nested ordered logit estimates of the level specific
characteristics included in Z. The positive signs of the parameters that belong to the effect of
productivity change (% hourly wage growth) and to the transaction costs (firing costs) suggest that
both variables have higher values at higher levels. A positive sign thus means that an increase in
the corresponding variable reduces the relative sizes at lower levels. With the number of levels
being constant (no flattening), this indicates the reorganization narrowed the bottom of the13
p y r a m i d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  t o p ,  w h i c h  i n d i c a t e s  a n  o v e r a l l  d e c l i n e  i n  a u t h o r i t y  a c r o s s  t h e  e n t i r e
hierarchy.
Non-monotonic changes in job structures
In Section 4 of the paper we discussed various interdisciplinary views on how variations in
transactions cost and in the effects technological innovations across levels will induce changes in
the distribution of authority (the control span), and that those changes may not be monotonic
across the entire hierarchical set-up of the firm. To illustrate this, we have examined the effects of
shocks in firing costs. Note that a similar exercise for productivity enhancing technology shocks
(shocks in hourly wage growth) would yield comparable results.
[INSERT Fig. 3]
Fig. 3 shows the predicted probability curves holding all the explanatory variables in the
model constant except firing costs. The relative sizes of hierarchical levels indeed change non-
monotonically in response to shocks in firing costs. The graphs for the bottom level (M1 and
NM1) are sloping downward in both cases. This means that the larger firing costs are the bigger
will be the decline of the lower levels relative to the upper ones. The graph for the second level
from below (M2 and NM2, the middle management of manual and non-manual workers,
respectively) is non-monotonic for both skill groups. When firing costs increase, first the control
span with respect to the bottom level increases. But after some turning point the graphs of M1 and
M2 and of NM1 and NM2 start moving downwards together, implying that the change in control
span will take place higher up in the hierarchy. Fig. 3 shows the effect of firing costs –  caused, for
example, by a policy shock that changes the term of notice or shocks in heterogeneous wage costs14
–  on the firm's organizational design. If firing costs increase and the firm restructures its
workplace, it will do so in a way that shifts profits from the lower to the higher levels of the
hierarchical job structure for the simple reason that firing workers in higher levels is more costly.
That effect is non-monotonic across hierarchical levels.
T h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  d i d  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  b e t t e r  p r o t e c t e d  w o r k e r s  f o r  l e s s
protected workers. In fact, what happened turned out to be quite the contrary. The firm chose to
restructure its hierarchical workforce in favour of workers employed in jobs that were
characterized by higher hourly wages with higher productivity and higher firing costs. This has
been observed for both manual and non-manual skill groups.
One could argue that the two variables included in Z, hourly wage growth and firing costs,
are also important predictors of individual lay-off risks. One way to test this is to include both
variables in the first step of the regression when the conditional individual probability of being
retained is estimated using worker specific attributes. The parameter estimate for firing costs in the
conditional logit regression is 0.042 with a SE of 0.086, and is not significantly different from
zero. The parameter estimate for the hourly wage change is 0.302 with a SE of 0.093, which is
significant. To choose which model describes the underlying decision process better, we computed
the compound log-likelihood values in both cases. The model that includes the hourly wage change
in X (and not in Z) estimates one parameter less and has a log-likelihood value of -6386.03 while
the model that includes the hourly wage change in Z (and not in X) has a  log-likelihood value of -
6086.51. From this we conclude that the latter model, being the one reported in Table 5, is the
model that explains the data more accurately.
[INSERT TABLE 6]15
The estimates for the profit thresholds hs gˆ  together with the inclusive values hs J ˆ  are given
in Table 6. Estimates for hs k ˆ  can be obtained from hs hs hs J ˆ ˆ ˆ g k = . The estimates hs k ˆ  can be
regarded as a model's specification test. For 1 0 < < hs k , cross-elasticities are biggest for workers in
the same h and s level. Values of 1 > hs k  may indicate that the assumed ordering is not specified
correctly and may point an incorrectly specified hierarchical decision structure. We find that 12 ˆ k  is
the only independence parameter that outside the unit interval. Aggregation may explain this
resul t. As we have noted bef ore l evel one f or non-m anual  workers actually exists of  two j oint
levels –   managers and heads of departments –  that were merged to obtain a large enough sub-
sample.
V. Restructuring and the Earnings Distribution inside the Firm
W e c an  u s e th e  d a ta  th a t u n d e rl i e  th e g r a ph s  i n  F i g .  3  to si m ul a te  th e  ef f ec ts  on  th e
distribution of earnings between manual and non-manual workers inside the firm caused by
respective changes in firing costs. The simulation exercise is conducted as follows. First, we
computed the average hourly wage for all hierarchical levels. The predicted probabilities presented
in Fig. 3 allow us to compute the composition of the hourly wage distribution for each skill group
relative to the change in firing costs. The observed changes in the earnings distribution then
originate from modifying compositions of levels within skill groups. Suppose that the changes are
similar for both skill groups. We can then portray how the earnings between skill groups change
because of changes in firing costs. The simulation outcomes are presented in Fig. 4.
[INSERT Fig. 4]16
Fig. 4 shows that an increase in firing costs increases hourly wages for manual as well as
for non-manual workers, but the latter increase is more substantial. The earnings difference
increases with the size of the change in firing costs. The mechanism that produces this result is as
follows. The highest levels in both skill groups have the lowest chance to be reduced because their
firing costs are higher compared to those of other levels in the same skill group. The earnings
difference between the top level of manual workers and the top level of non-manual workers is
larger than that between the bottom levels. Increases in firing costs will shift the relative demand
toward the upper hierarchical levels, thus increasing the average earnings within each skill group
as well as enhancing the earnings difference between skill groups. Firing costs offer better
protection to the workers in jobs that are assigned to higher levels of the organization.
VI. Conclusions
If one wants to understand changes in the labour market, it is necessary to understand what is
going on inside firms. This paper studies in detail the restructuring of a large multi-plant firm’ s
workforce. While many workers were displaced –  the restructuring was part of a bankruptcy and
involved the largest mass lay-off in the history of the Netherlands – , the input ratio of manual to
non-manual workers before and after restructuring remained unchanged. Looking more closely at
the job structures of manual and non-manual workers we find changes in authority that have not
been predicted by economic models of workplace organization, but that indeed were found earlier
in management studies. The paper shows that non-monotonic changes in the control spans, where
the authority of top and lower management is increased while the authority of the middle
management declines, can be explained as the compound result of technological innovations and
large transaction costs.17
A discrete decision model that incorporates the features of hierarchical organizational
structure is estimated using a rich personnel dataset of a downsizing Dutch aircraft manufacturer.
We find that jobs in the upper hierarchical levels of each skill group benefit most from
productivity enhancing shocks. Moreover, firing costs offer better protection to the workers in jobs
that are assigned to higher levels of the organization. Increases in firing costs as well as increases
in productivity will shift the relative demand toward jobs in the upper hierarchical regions, which
will increase the average earnings for each skill group. Since the difference in productivity
between the top levels of manual workers and non-manual workers is larger than between the
lower levels, these shifts in demand caused by increases in firing costs and productivity will also
enhance the earnings difference between skill groups.
Although data from only one firm have been used in this study, some general remarks are
warranted. First, the fact that restructuring costs are large and largely sunk implies that observed
organizational changes may constitute composite responses to different shocks. Future
developments of theoretical assignment models that accommodate such responses may yield non-
monotonic adjustments of authority across hierarchical levels. Second, when the introduction of
innovations in communication technology or production technology at the workplace coincide with
changes in the structure of jobs, biases in favour of specific skills can result from shocks in
productivity (e.g. Bresnahan et al., 2002), but can result also from heterogeneity in the –  sunk –
firing costs that such reorganizations entail.
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Table 1. Inputs of skills before and after restructuring of the workplace
Manual workers Non-manual workers Total
N1
Shares per
row ⁄  column
N2
Shares per
row ⁄  column
N
Shares per
row ⁄  column
Total 3531 .655 ⁄   1.0 1858 .345 ⁄   1.0 5389 1.0 ⁄   1.0
Selected 705 .656 ⁄   .20 370 .344 ⁄   .20 1075 1.0 ⁄   .20
Displaced 2826 .655 ⁄   .80 1488 .345 ⁄   .80 4314 1.0 ⁄   .80
Notes: This Table shows the numbers of workers employed in two different skill levels before the
realization of the restructuring plan, after the selection had taken place, as well as the number of
workers affected by the reorganization of the workforce of Fokker.
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1 NM M NM/M NM M NM/M
All workers Mean 45.52 26.62 1.71 46.31 26.59 1.74 1.9
St.Dev 11.96 4.13 2.90 12.37 4.11 3.01 3.8
Women & Men
Women Mean 40.49 24.72 1.64 42.57 23.91 1.78 8.7
St.Dev 9.72 3.64 2.67 9.93 4.26 2.33 -12.7
Men Mean 45.80 26.85 1.71 46.56 26.91 1.73 1.4
St.Dev 12.02 4.12 2.91 12.49 3.98 3.14 7.7
Education
2
Educ:low Mean 42.45 26.56 1.60 43.54 26.59 1.64 2.4
St.Dev 9.23 4.10 2.25 10.54 4.08 2.58 14.7
Educ:high Mean 46.84 26.85 1.74 47.70 26.56 1.80 2.9
St.Dev 12.74 4.21 3.03 13.00 4.25 3.06 1.1
Tenure
3
Tenure:low Mean 42.38 24.95 1.70 42.92 24.81 1.73 1.8
St.Dev 10.66 3.69 2.89 11.04 3.33 3.32 14.8
Tenure:high Mean 49.53 28.35 1.75 50.29 28.61 1.76 0.6
St.Dev 12.34 3.83 3.22 12.69 3.98 3.19 -1.0
Age
4
Age:low Mean 39.40 25.42 1.55 39.97 25.45 1.57 1.3
St.Dev 8.11 3.51 2.31 7.92 3.23 2.45 6.0
Age:high Mean 50.46 28.16 1.79 51.52 28.29 1.82 1.6
St.Dev 12.29 4.34 2.83 12.94 4.66 2.77 -2.0
Notes:
1NM=non-manual workers; M=manual workers
2Education: high is 8: higher vocational schooling, or 9: university;
3Tenure: low is below median tenure of 15 years;
4Age: low is below average age of 39 years.22
Table 3. Education of manual and non-manual workers in different hierarchical levels
Notes: The general schooling degrees, like basic education, lower, intermediate and higher general schooling degrees
are prerequisites for pursuing a given vocational or general education in the Dutch educational system. Basic education
is a prerequisite for any other degree. After having completed basic education, it is possible to either follow a lower
vocational schooling course or to attend any of the school forms leading to a general schooling degree. Lower general
education (mavo) makes one eligible to follow intermediate vocational training or complete an apprenticeship. An
intermediate general schooling degree qualifies for higher vocational schooling, a higher general schooling degree
(havo) qualifies for higher vocational schooling (hbo), while the highest level general schooling degree is a
prerequisite for pursuing a college or university degree. In addition, it is possible to pursue the next higher schooling
level after having obtained a given schooling degree; similarly it is possible to enter the next higher level of vocational
schooling after having completed vocational schooling at the level just below, e.g., after having completed
intermediate vocational schooling one is eligible to enter higher vocational schooling. (see: Dohmen et al. 2004).
Education description: 1=Basic education; 2=Lower vocational degree; 3=Lower general schooling degree;
4=Apprenticeship; 5=Intermediate general schooling degree; 6=Intermediate vocational degree; 7=Higher general

























































Table 4. Changes in organizational design
Notes: The table shows the number of workers at the different hierarchical levels before as well as after the restructuring had taken place. Authority is
computed as the number of workers in a particular level divided by the number of workers in the level above for a given skill type (control span). ǻS is
the size selected workers as a percentage of the people working at that hierarchical level before the reorganization. ǻA is the percentage change in
authority at each hierarchical level.







Hierarchical Level Size Authority Size Authority ǻS ǻA
M1: Team Worker 2281 - 496 - 22 -
M2: Team Leader 765 2.98 187 2.65 24 -11
M3: Head Production Team 548 1.40 84 2.23 15 59







Size Authority Size Authority ǻS ǻA
NM1 : Assistant Engineer 803 - 148 - 18 -
NM2 : Engineer 505 1.59 107 1.38 21 -13
NM3 : Senior Engineer 360 1.40 65 1.65 18 18
NM4 : Manager 207 1.74 52 1.25 25 -2824
Table 5. Estimation results
PART II: Nested ordered logit estimates based on level specific characteristics
Manual workers Non-manual workers
mean [SD] estimate (SE) mean [SD] estimate (SE)
Technological innovation - productivity
hourly wage growth (in %) 0.778  [0.459] 1.276 (0.046) 1.177  [0.646] 0.617 (0.028)
Transactions costs
firing costs (in 10,000 Dfl) 1.194  [0.540] 2.463 (0.094) 2.077  [1.261] 1.514 (0.058)
N 3594 1875
PART II –  Log L -1701.41 -2218.39
Notes: SD in squared brackets; SE in parentheses; Coefficients with p-value < 0.05 arein bold.
PART I: Conditional logit estimates of firing probabilities based on worker specific attributes
variable mean [SD] estimate (SE)
Performance indicators
evaluation score 6.579    [1.297] -0.165    (0.030)
tenure 14.568    [7.831]   0.001    (0.008)
education 5.329    [2.312] 0.061    (0.026)
vocational dummy 0.686    [0.464]   0.156    (0.091)
Behavioral characteristics
internal courses 6.604    [6.736]  0.016    (0.007)
external courses 1.057    [1.506]   0.051    (0.028)
distance (in km) -0.063    (0.018)
Social criteria
age 39.090    [8.286] 0.025    (0.008)
female 0.088    [0.284]   0.081    (0.149)
married 0.613     [0.481] -0.241    (0.084)
disability (in %) 2.525    [14.664]   0.003    (0.004)
N 5469
PART I - log(L) -2166.7125
Table 6. Thresholds, inclusive values, and independence parameters













Level 1 0 31 = g 165 . 8 ˆ
31 = J
[1.436]
0 31 = k 0 42 = g 103 . 7 ˆ
42 = J
[0.976]
0 42 = k
Level 2 088 . 6 ˆ 21 = g
(0.191)
096 . 7 ˆ
21 = J
[1.274]
699 . 0 ˆ 21 = k
          (0.043)
416 . 5 ˆ 32 = g
(0.216)
676 . 6 ˆ
32 = J
[0.856]
654 . 0 ˆ 32 = k
          (0.048)
Level 3 745 . 7 ˆ 11 = g
(0.213)
726 . 6 ˆ
11 = J
[0.994]
949 . 0 ˆ 11 = k
          (0.049)
283 . 7 ˆ 22 = g
(0.248)
352 . 6 ˆ
22 = J
 [0.798]
937 . 0 ˆ 22 = k
          (0.058)
Level 4 668 . 9 ˆ 12 = g
(0.308)
700 . 5 ˆ
12 = J
[0.790]
386 . 1 ˆ 12 = k
          (0.079)
Notes:
hs gˆ  is the maximum likelihood estimate of the threshold of level h for skill s;
hs J ˆ  is the estimate of
the inclusive value; and
hs hs hs J ˆ / ˆ ˆ g k = .  SE are given between brackets.26
Fig. 1. Tree structure of the firm's restructuring problem
Notes: The tree structure represents the top-down decision structure in the downsizing process. Non-


















Fig. 1: Term of notice and firing costs
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Fig. 4. Firing costs and the effects on the average hourly earnings for different skill groups
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